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In recent years, social movements and popular media have drawn attention 
to the issue of income inequality in the United States. This growing inequal-
ity in the distribution of income is often seen as a function of stagnating wage 
growth in the U.S. economy. There appears to be a fairly broad consensus 
among commentators that wage growth for many workers in the U.S. has stag-
nated in recent decades, though the precise causes and implications of this 
trend are a matter of considerable dispute. Some see it as a function of stagnant 
productivity growth, while others attribute it to the declining strength of the 
labor movement. This paper uses multiple regression analyses in an attempt 
to provide an empirical means to judge the theoretical salience of these con-
tending viewpoints. The results of this study indicate that while wage growth 
has in fact maintained a positive correlation with productivity, this correla-
tion is much weaker than expected, particularly for manufacturing industries. 
Furthermore, while labor union strength appears to be an insignificant factor 
in the determination of wages for manufacturing industries, it retains a strong 
statistical significance in service sector wages. I argue that this finding reflects 
a historical shift in the composition of U.S. industry. The data gathered in this 
study supports the view that labor union density plays a role in the strength of 
wage-productivity elasticity, which raises important questions of how best to 
conceptualize wage growth and aggregate income distribution from the stand-
point of economic theory. 
Introduction
How do empirical trends in the U.S. economy give credence to contending conceptual-
izations of wage determination? That is, does empirical evidence suggest that wages are 
primarily a function of productivity (as neoclassical theory would suggest) or social forces 
(as some working in heterodox theoretical traditions would contend)? How might wage 
determination differ between sectors of the economy?
http://trace.tennessee.edu/pursuit
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To answer these questions, I conducted a regression analysis of real wage growth in 
the U.S. economy since the mid-1960s. Separate regression models were constructed for the 
manufacturing (goods-producing) and service sectors. The results indicate that wages have 
maintained a positive correlation with productivity in both sectors, though this correlation 
is relatively weak for manufacturing industries. In addition, one measure of labor union 
strength is shown to be statistically insignificant for manufacturing industries while it retains 
a strong statistical significance for service industries. It would appear, then, that labor union 
strength could play a role in how wage growth responds to productivity increases.
Section 2 will briefly outline the objective of our analysis and its theoretical basis, 
while Section 3 will cover the choice of variables and the intuition behind their inclusion. 
Section 4 will explore the models to be estimated and will discuss issues pertaining to the 
choice of estimator. Section 5 will contain discussion of the results, along with suggestions 
for further research. 
Theoretical Framework
In recent years, long-term trends in wage growth and income inequality in the United 
States have become important topics of debate in both the media and in academia. Contrary 
to hitherto prevailing assumptions about living standards, some evidence seems to vindi-
cate the claims of those who argue that the standard of living for many U.S. citizens has 
faltered over the last several decades (Carter 2007; Mishel 2012). However, there is very 
little consensus over why wage growth has stagnated or how changes in wage growth over 
time should be conceptualized. 
According to the neoclassical theory of distribution, real wages are equal to the mar-
ginal productivity of labor, which is a measure of the marginal contribution to a firm’s 
output of hiring an additional worker, holding capital constant. The marginal productivity 
of labor (MPL), in turn, is assumed to be proportional to average labor productivity if the 
associated production function is characterized by a Cobb-Douglas form (Mankiw 2010). 
Despite long-standing claims that this characterization is misleading (Shaikh 1974), some 
empirical evidence shows a strong positive correlation between the growth rate of labor pro-
ductivity and the growth rate of real wages in the post-war U.S. economy (Mankiw 2010). 
However, the mere existence of this empirical correlation does not effectively vali-
date the theory, for it does not tell us anything about who is receiving compensation in-
creases and whether or not those recipients are responsible for the corresponding pro-
ductivity increases. Moseley argues that disaggregating the data to distinguish between 
supervisory and non-supervisory workers would show “no close link between productivity 
and the real wage in recent decades” (2012, 123). Unfortunately, this claim cannot be cor-
roborated, as the author does not provide a complete analysis.
Alternatively, there are those who contend that wages are a “socially determined 
variable” (Shaikh 2003, 131). As such, wages are perceived to be primarily a function 
of the strength of employees to force their employers to increase labor’s share of income 
(Shaikh 2003; Carter 2007; Rowthorn 1980). Proponents of this view, which is characteris-
tic of some heterodox theoretical traditions, would argue that employers have little incen-
tive to voluntarily increase the wages of their employees and, as such, employees must 
actively strive to put pressure on their employers in order to increase or even maintain their 
standard of living due to inflation.
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Although these two views are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they paint a very 
different picture of how wage trends change over time. An empirical analysis of trends in 
real wages over the last several decades would presumably allow us to substantiate some 
of these theoretical claims and conjecture their relative importance in aggregate wage de-
termination. In light of Moseley’s criticism, however, this analysis should control for pos-
sible discrepancies in wage/productivity correlation by disaggregating the data into those 
in charge (supervisory workers) and those not in charge (production and non-superviso-
ry workers). Unfortunately, data on supervisory compensation are not readily available. 
However, data on production/non-supervisory workers are available; therefore, this study 
focused only on production/non-supervisory workers. With that said, it would be interest-
ing to replicate this study for supervisory workers in order to see how trends in their com-
pensation differ over time from that of non-supervisory workers. 
In order to control for changes in the industrial composition of the U.S. economy 
over the decades in question, separate models for goods-producing and service-providing 
industries were estimated. This allowed for an evaluation of how these industries interact 
and how they are differentially impacted by macroeconomic dynamics. It should be not-
ed that in this study, all personal characteristics of individual workers (i.e. race/ethnicity, 
gender, education level, etc.) were abstracted, not because these factors are irrelevant but 
because this study focused on an examination of wage trends in the context of aggregate 
income distribution, and in this regard such characteristics as gender and educational level 
are beyond the scope of this paper.
Variable Selection
The variables chosen are intended to capture the effects on wage determination from sever-
al different sources. The choice of wage measure, in particular, deserves some justification.
The data on employee earnings have been deflated by the CPI-W (Consumer Price 
Index for urban wage earners and clerical workers), which adjusts for changes in the prices 
of consumer goods. There are two caveats to this choice: First, it is argued that in order to 
remain consistent with marginal productivity theory measures of employee compensation 
must be deflated by the implicit price deflator for the sector in question rather than the stan-
dard consumer price index, which is how the BLS calculates real earnings (Sullivan 1997). 
This would deflate earnings in a manner that accounts for changes in the cost of producer 
goods (i.e., the goods that producers purchase as inputs into the production process). From 
the consumer’s perspective, however, purchasing power is a function of how many con-
sumer goods can be bought with those earnings.
Therefore, it makes more sense to use a consumer price index if one is concerned 
with wages as purchasing power rather than as costs. This is more consistent with the ques-
tion of how real wages (i.e. purchasing power) have changed over time. Another caveat to 
the choice of earnings data is that, due to limitations in data availability, they do not reflect 
changes in employee benefits (e.g. insurance, retirement, etc.). However, accounting for 
these benefits has a relatively slight impact on the absolute magnitudes of employee com-
pensation and does little to affect the long term trend in wage changes (see Mishel 2012, 
charts 1 and 2). Furthermore, the change in benefits as a proportion of total compensation 
over the last several decades has been negligible (Mishel 2012) and therefore will not 
jeopardize our results.
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Measures of output per hour worked will allow us to account for changes in pro-
ductivity, which theory would suggest exhibits a strong positive correlation with wage 
growth.2 Presumably, as workers become more productive their employers are going to be 
willing to pay them more for their labor power. It is a little more difficult, however, to quan-
tify the pressure that employees put on employers for better pay. Since labor union strength 
has historically played a strong role in working-class struggle with employers for wage 
increases, I chose to analyze two variables pertaining to labor union strength. Following 
Carter (2007), I included a variable for union density measured as the percentage of the 
labor force unionized in any given year. Since union density does not necessarily capture 
union activity, I also included the annual number of work stoppages involving 1,000 or 
more workers. In addition, I included a variable for the federal minimum wage rate in 
order to capture the effect of federal labor standards on wage growth. All other variables 
are intended to control for the effects of supply and demand in the labor market, with the 
exception of a dummy variable intended to capture the effects of war on the labor market. 
Table 1. Explanation of Variables1
Variable Description Sample Mean 
(Standard Deviation)
Ln(gdswge)  
(Dependent)
Average hourly earnings of production/non-supervisory 
employees, goods-producing industries, 1982-84 dollars
2.21 (0.04)
Ln(srvwge) 
(Dependent)
Average hourly earnings of production/non-supervisory 
employees, private service-providing industries, 1982-84 dollars
2.09 (0.06)
Wrkstp (+) Annual work stoppages involving 1,000 or more workers 131.6 (135.07)
Unmprt (-) Annual average unemployment rate, civilian labor force (16 
years and over)
6.05 (1.65)
Ln(prdctvtyg) (+) Output per hour (2005 = 100), manufacturing sector 3.98 (0.44)
Ln(prdctvtynfrm) (+) Output per hour (2005 = 100), nonfarm business sector 4.24 (0.26)
Lbrfrcunn (+) % of labor force unionized (private sector) 16.15 (8.15)
Ln(minwg) (+) Federal minimum wage rate, 1982-84 dollars 3.37 (0.53)
Gdshrs (+) Average weekly hours of production/non-supervisory employees, 
goods-producing industries
40.17 (0.52)
Srvhrs (+) Average weekly hours of production/non-supervisory employees, 
service-providing industries
33.57 (1.49)
Mnftempl (+) # of production and non-supervisory employees in goods 
producing industries
16817.85 (1261.86)
Gdpgrwth (+) Annual GDP percent change, 2012 dollars 6.93 (2.97)
War (+) Dummy variable = 1 if U.S. involved in war 0.52 (0.51)
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Econometric Models and Estimation Methods
The following models were estimated3:
The following models were estimated3: 
 
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔! = 
𝑓𝑓(  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤! ,𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢!!!,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝! , 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙! ,𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚! ,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟! ,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ!,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤!) + εt   
(1) 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠! =
𝑓𝑓(𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤! ,𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢!!!,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝! , 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙! ,𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚! ,𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚! , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟! ,
                                                                                                                                                          𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ! ,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤!) + εt                                        
(2) 
 
Natural log transformations were used where appropriate, as indicated in Table 1. In  
particular, variables pertaining to wages, productivity, and minimum wage were transformed so 
as to facilitate convenient interpretation. 
Time-series data were gleaned from various government sources, particularly the Bureau  
of Labor Statistics and Bureau of Economic Analysis4. All observations are annual measures. 
The decision to use annual data was partly motivated by a desire to account for a longer time 
period and partly by limited availability of data for particular variables. There are 48 
observations in our dataset, corresponding to the years 1964-2011.    
In order to test for first-order serial correlation, both models were estimated using 
Ordinary Least Squares and then a separate regression was performed on the residuals with the  
residuals from the time period immediately prior to the current period as the explanatory variable 
and ρ as the coefficient. The associated test statistics are reported in Table 2. In both instances a 
null hypothesis of no serial correlation was rejected, indicating the need to correct for this. Given 
Natural log transformations were used where appropriate, as indicated in Table 1. In par-
ticular, variables pertaining to wages, productivity, and minimum wage were transformed 
so as to facilitate co venient i terpretation.
Time-series data were gleaned from various government sources, particularly the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bur au of Economic Analysis4. All observations are annual 
measures. The decision to use annual data was partly motivated by a desire to account for a 
longer time period and partly by limited availability of data for particular variables. There 
are 48 observations in our dataset, corresponding to the years 1964-2011.
In order to test for first-order serial correlation, both models were estimated using 
Ordinary Least Squares and then a separate regression was performed on the residuals with 
the residuals from the time period immediately prior to the current period as the explana-
tory variable and ρ as the coefficient. The associated test statistics are reported in Table 
2. In both instances a null hypothesis of no serial correlation was rejected, indicating the 
need to correct for this. Given the relatively small sample size, the use of a Prais-Winsten 
estimator was chosen as a remedy for serial correlation in the error terms.
A White test was nducted on he Prais-Winsten estimated residuals and coeffi-
cients from model 1 in order to check for possible heteroskedasticity issues. The associ-
ated test statistics are reported in Table 2. Based on a chi-square test, a null hypothesis of 
constant error term variances was rejected, and thus the final estimation procedure was 
conducted using robust standard errors as a remedy for possible heteroskedasticity. This 
was also conducted for model 2, given its strong resemblance to model 1.
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Results
Table 2 contains the estimation results for both models. It would appear that for goods-
producing industries, productivity change has been one of the primary indicators of real 
wage growth for production/non-supervisory employees, and likewise for those working 
in the service industry. However, the wage/productivity elasticity is weaker than ex-
pected for the former, while it is especially strong for the latter. This could be due to the 
fact that the service sector is relatively labor intensive, thus leading employees to capture 
a greater proportion of increased output. Furthermore, increases in average weekly hours 
worked appear to have a slight negative impact on average hourly earnings. Though this 
is contrary to what was initially expected, it is not necessarily inconsistent with intuition 
if one considers the possibility that stagnant or declining real earnings could lead to an 
increase in weekly hours worked as employees try to make up for the loss in purchasing 
power.
What may appear to be particularly surprising here is the relatively slight impact of 
unionization on the earnings of goods-producing employees. Contrary to intuition, the in-
fluence of unions is statistically insignificant for those industries, which are typically con-
sidered bastions of union strength. However, the reasons for this are likely historical. Given 
that our data only cover the last five decades, the majority of the time period in question has 
been characterized by a decline in the density and strength of manufacturing labor unions. 
Union density declined from a high of 31% in 1964 to a low of 6.9% in 2011. This decline 
was relatively slight throughout the 60s and 70s, but became more dramatic around the turn 
of the 1980s. Therefore it is actually not very surprising that the overall impact of unions 
on wage growth in our models has been negligible. It should be noted, however, that as a 
consequence of shifts in the composition of U.S. industry, service-sector employment has 
grown throughout the period in question. This could explain why union density maintained 
a statistically significant, positive impact on service-sector earnings.
Carter has indicated that the wage share of total output began to decline around 
1979, suggesting that “a regime change occurred in international primary distribution, one 
associated with a decrease in the wage share … as wage earners in many countries experi-
enced erosion in their command of output produced” (2007, 581). A preliminary analysis 
suggests that if the time period is disaggregated into the years prior to 1979 and the years 
following 1979, the picture looks very different. Appendices 2 and 3 contain the results of 
this analysis. Most of the variables analyzed in this study are statistically significant for the 
years leading up to 1979 and statistically insignificant for the years after 1979. Given the 
small sample sizes associated with these additional regressions, one should not consider 
these results conclusive. However, this does suggest that some of our unexpected findings 
could be the result of changing historical and political regimes in the U.S. This would ap-
pear to justify a more thorough analysis of these specific periods.
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Table 2: Estimation Results for 1964-2011
Natural log of average hourly earnings of production/non-supervisory employees, 1982-84 
dollars
Variable Model (1) Model (2)
Constant 2.12** (0.44) -1.492 (0.952)
Wrkstp 0.0000286 (0.0000695) -0.00004 (0.00006)
Unmprt 0.003 (0.003) 0.005 (0.004)
ln(prdctvtyg) 0.16** (0.064)
ln(prdctvtynfrm) 0.537** (0.122)
Lbrfrcunn 0.002 (0.004) 0.0095** (0.0039)
ln(minwg) 0.023 (0.047) 0.034 (0.042)
Gdshrs -0.017** (0.008)
Srvhrs 0.028* (0.016)
Mnftempl 8.04e-06 (6.91e-06)
Gdpgrwth 0.002* (0.001) -0.002* (0.0014)
War -0.0008 (0.009) 0.0067 (0.0094)
N 47 47
R2 0.9512 0.9633
F-statistic 2.41 2.8
ᵡ2 46.7979 0.000
p-value (ρ) 0.000 0.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively
Conclusion
Our analysis has shown that from an empirical standpoint the connection between wage 
growth and productivity changes remains significant, if not strong. However, it also sug-
gests that the “organizational or institutional strength of labor” is an important factor to 
consider when dealing with questions of wage determination and income distribution 
(Shaikh 2003, 139). Therefore, whether stagnant real wages are primarily a function of 
declining productivity (Sullivan 1997) or the declining strength of labor is difficult to de-
termine for sure. It would appear, though, that both should be accounted for in future 
empirical investigations, lest too much emphasis be placed on one at the expense of con-
sideration of the other.
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It would be interesting to follow up this study with a more detailed analysis of wage 
trends in specific historical periods, perhaps utilizing sub-annual time periods as a way of 
increasing sample size and estimation accuracy. Furthermore, a similar analysis of trends 
in supervisory-employee earnings is certainly warranted. Hopefully these kinds of studies 
can shed light on some of the most pressing economic issues of our time, providing insight 
into how policy initiatives might curb the growth of income inequality and poverty in the 
21st century.
Endnotes
 1 Data sources cited in Appendix (1)
 2 The choice of productivity measure was motivated by a desire to match the hourly mea-
surement of wages.
 3 See Table 1 for description of variables, including summary statistics.
 4 See Appendix (1) for precise information on data sourcing.
Appendix 1: Data Sources
Bureau of Economic Analysis. GDP percent change from preceding period. Available from http://
www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp. Retrieved November 12, 2012. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2012. Major Work Stoppages (Annual). Available from http://www.bls.
gov/news.release/wkstp.toc.htm. Retrieved November 12, 2012.
_____. Current Employment Statistics. Available from http://www.bls.gov/ces/#tables. Retrieved 
November 12, 2012.
_____. Current Population Survey. Available from http://www.bls.gov/cps/prev_yrs.htm. Retrieved 
November 12, 2012.
_____. Labor Productivity and Costs. Available from http://www.bls.gov/lpc/. Retrieved November 
12, 2012.
_____. Union Membership (Annual). Available from http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.toc.
htm. Retrieved November 12, 2012.
Hirsch, Barry T. 2008. Data appendix to “Sluggish Institutions in a Dynamic World: Can Unions 
and Industrial Competition Coexist?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22(1): 153-76. 
Available from http://www.unionstats.com/. Retrieved November 12, 2012.
U.S. Department of Labor. Federal Minimum Wage Rates 1955 – 2012. Available from http://www.
infoplease.com/ipa/A0774473.html. Retrieved November 12, 2012.
2013] Wage Determination 19 
Pursuit: The Journal of Undergraduate Research at the University of Tennessee
Appendix 2: Estimation Results for 1964-1979
Natural log of average hourly earnings of production/non-supervisory employees, 1982-84 
dollars
Variable Model (1) Model (2)
Constant 2.098** (0.615) -6.39* (2.71)
Wrkstp 0.00023** (0.00003) 0.0003** (0.000057)
Unmprt -0.0045 (0.0024) -0.027** (0.005)
ln(prdctvtyg) 0.552** (0.082)
ln(prdctvtynfrm) 1.739** (0.388)
Lbrfrcunn 0.01** (0.0013) 0.017** (0.0016)
ln(minwg) -0.221** (0.032) -0.284** (0.066)
Gdshrs -0.049** (0.0096)
Srvhrs 0.0585 (0.032)
Mnftempl -0.00003** (7.24e-06)
Gdpgrwth 0.014** (0.0035) 0.01118* (0.0047)
N 15 15
R2 0.9999 0.9999
F-statistic 801.41 147.13
Appendix 3: Estimation Results for 1980-2011
Natural log of average hourly earnings of production/non-supervisory employees, 1982-84 
dollars
Variable Model (1) Model (2)
Constant 2.457** (0.423) -0.332 (0.874)
Wrkstp 6.03e-06 (0.00016) -0.0001 (0.00016)
Unmprt 0.0033 (0.0022) 0.0019 (0.0049)
ln(prdctvtyg) 0.074 (0.063)
ln(prdctvtynfrm) 0.434** (0.0928)
Lbrfrcunn 0.0025 (0.006) 0.0123** (0.0048)
ln(minwg) 0.036 (0.05) 0.0286 (0.0529)
Gdshrs -0.016** (0.008)
Srvhrs 0.0096 (0.0212)
Mnftempl 1.26e-06 (0.00001)
Gdpgrwth 0.00097 (0.0011) -0.0017 (0.0018)
N 32 32
R2 0.9953 0.9960
F-statistic 1.33 18.00
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